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needs assessment: lessons from school funding 
formulae in England and Scotland 
 
Abstract 
dŚĞh< ?ƐĚĞǀŽůǀĞĚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?'Ɛ ?ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞďůŽĐŬŐƌĂŶƚƐƚŽĨŝŶĂŶĐĞĂůŵŽƐƚĂůůƚŚĞŝƌĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞ ?
The Barnett formula used to calculate these grants is often criticised because it does not consider 
ƚŚĞ'Ɛ ?ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŶĞĞĚƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞĨĞĂƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨallocating block grants by needs assessment is 
often questioned, given the contestability of spending needs.  
This paper compares the formula used within England to assess the education spending needs of 
local authorities there with the equivalent Scottish formula, by using each formula in turn to 
calculate the relative spending needs of the UK territories.  The rationale is to consider how similar 
ƚŚĞƚǁŽĨŽƌŵƵůĂĞĂƌĞŝŶŚŽǁƚŚĞǇĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĞƐ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŶĞĞĚƐĨŽƌĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ă
major responsibility of the devolved governments. 
The results show that the English and Scottish education allocation formulae produce similar 
ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĞƐ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŶĞĞĚƐ ?dŚŝƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚŝƚŵĂǇďĞŵŽƌĞ
feasible to allocate eduĐĂƚŝŽŶƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞh< ?ƐĚĞǀŽůǀĞĚƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĞƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶŶĞĞĚƐĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ
than some have suggested. The results also suggest some inequity in current patterns of education 
spending across the UK. 
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I. Introduction 
Recent decades have witnessed increased decentralisation of public sector activity in many 
developed and developing countries (Lago-Peñas, et al., 2011). Consequently, a growing proportion 
of government revenues are used to finance subcentral levels of government. Across OECD countries 
around a quarter of central Government tax revenue is spent on inter-governmental grants 
(Blöchliger and King, 2006), and the question of how such grants are allocated is receiving 
widespread attention. Many countries utilise funding formulae for allocating grant to decentralised 
levels of government, but these formula differ widely. Australia for example uses an extremely 
detailed formula to allocate grant to States based on spending needs and tax capacity 
(Commonwealth Grants Commission, 2010); Spain uses a much simpler formula to allocate grant to 
Autonomous Communities based on spending needs (Bosch, 2009); whilst Canada allocates grant to 
Provinces based wholly on tax capacity, with no consideration of spending need (Lecours and 
Béland, 2010). 
The three devolved governments (DGs) of the UK (the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government, 
and the Northern Ireland Assembly) currently have little ability to raise tax and are almost wholly 
reliant on a block grant from the UK government to fund their spending (although this is beginning 
to change, as discussed below). Since 1979, these block grants (or more precisely, the annual 
changes in them) have been determined by the Barnett Formula.   This formula determines the 
change to each D' ?s grant based on changes in spending on devolved services in England, and the 
 ?Ɛpopulation (HM Treasury, 2010). For example, if the UK government announces a £100m 
increase in health spending in England, if 99% of all UK health spending is devolved ?ĂŶĚŝĨ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ
ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŝƐ ? ?A?ŽĨŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ?ƚŚĞŶƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞ ƚ ?ƐďƵĚŐĞƚ would increase by £9.9 
million. Any Barnett-calculated change is added to the existing grant (the baseline). It follows that 
each territorǇ ?Ɛ current grant level is a function of the grant that the territory received in 1979, and 
all subsequent applications of the Barnett formula. 
The Barnett formula was introduced on the assumption that it would be a temporary measure, and 
has frequently been criticised as inequitable because it takes no account of the spending needs of 
the DGs and England (McLean, et al., 2008; Select Committee on the Barnett Formula, 2009; 
Independent Commission on Funding and Finance for Wales, 2010). The grant allocations have often 
been accused of being too generous to Scotland and Northern Ireland (NI), but less so to Wales 
(McLean and McMillan, 2005; Mackay and Williams, 2005). Although the Barnett Formula bears the 
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brunt of this criticism, the formula cannot be blamed for creating any excess generosity: it can only 
be blamed for not sufficiently reducing any excess generosity that already existed in 19791. 
Recent years have seen growing calls for the Barnett formula to be replaced with a formula which 
ƚĂŬĞƐƐŽŵĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĞƐ ?ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŶĞĞĚƐ.  The Holtham Commission (Independent 
Commission on Funding and Finance for Wales, 2010), the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Barnett Formula (2009), the Commission on Devolution in Wales (2012), the Local Government 
Association in England (Local Government Association, 2013) and the All Party Parliamentary 
Taxation Group (2013) have all recommended that the formula should be replaced by a needs based 
spending assessment.  
Greater autonomy over tax-raising is likely to be devolved to each of the DGs over the next few 
ǇĞĂƌƐ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?dŚĞ^ŵŝƚŚŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽ ?-vote at the 
independence referendum in 2014, has recommended that control over income tax, half of VAT 
revenues raised in Scotland, and various other smaller taxes, should be devolved to the Scottish 
Government. These recommendations have already been written into draft legislative clauses 
(Cabinet Office, 2015) and are expected to be legislated for in the next parliament. The Wales Act 
devolves Landfill Tax and Stamp Duty tax to the Welsh Government, and income tax is expected to 
be partially devolved to the Welsh Government following the recommendations of the Silk 
Commission (Commission on Devolution in Wales, 2012). The Corporation Tax (Northern Ireland) Bill 
was published in January 2015 and will allow for Corporation Tax revenues to be devolved to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly from 2017. Tax devolution inevitably implies some reduction in the level 
of block grant transfer to the DGs from the UK Government.  
Nonetheless, a substantial level of block grant transfer from the UK to the devolved governments 
will continue to be necessary to address the imbalance between revenue raising and spending by the 
DGs, so the question of how this grant should be allocated remains. Prior to the Scottish 
ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŝŶh< ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ‘ǀŽǁĞĚ ?ƚŽƌĞƚĂŝŶƚŚĞĂƌŶĞƚƚ
Formula throughout the next parliament, but beyond this there is likely to be further pressure to 
reconsider how grant is allocated to the DGs. The UK Government has recently announced the 
                                                          
1 A mathematical property of the Barnett Formula is that it should induce convergence in per capita spending 
levels between the devolved territories and England over time. This is because, for a given nominal increase in 
 ‘ŶŐůŝƐŚ ?ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĂƉŝƚĂƐpending increment is the same across administrations, and thus the effect 
of the different initial spending levels should become proportionately less over time. However, it is clear that 
convergence has not occurred as quickly as would have been expected, especially for Scotland, due to the 
success of the devolved territories in periodically bargaining for additional grant increments outwith the 
operation of the Barnett formula (Christie and Swales, 2010). 
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ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ ‘ĨƵŶĚŝŶŐĨůŽŽƌ ?ƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚtĞůƐŚƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞĨƵŶĚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚďǇŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŚŝƐǁŝůů
ƉƌĞƐƵŵĂďůǇƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐŽŵĞĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨtĂůĞƐ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŶĞĞĚƐƚŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚŝƐĨůŽŽƌ ? 
In fact, needs assessment formulae are already used extensively to allocate resources within the DGs 
to health boards, local government and schools (Smith, 2006; National Audit Office, 2011). However, 
a major argument used against using needs formula to allocate resources to the DGs is that needs 
assessment is inherently subjective, so that it will be impossible for the DGs to agree on a needs 
assessment formula (McLean and McMillan, 2005; Midwinter, 2002).   
This paper tests the hypothesis that the UK and devolved governments would be unable to agree on 
an assessment of spending needs, using spending needs for compulsory school age education as an 
application. Specifically, the paper compares the formula used by the UK government to allocate 
education resources across local authorities (LAs) in England, with the formula used by the Scottish 
Government to allocate education resources across LAs in Scotland2. This is done by applying each 
formula in turn to every UK LA to calculate its relative spending need on each formula. Then, within 
each DA, the spending needs for each LA are summed to calculate the relative spending needs of 
each DA as a whole according to both formulae. 
The rationale for this analysis is to compare how the English and Scottish formulae assess the 
relative spending needs of different DGs for school-age education. The more similar their 
assessments are, the greater is the potential for agreement on a spending needs formula to replace 
Barnett. This is not to say that a Barnett replacement should use either the English or Scottish 
formulae for assessing education spending needs, but rather to identify where disagreements 
around needs assessment are likely to arise, and the potential magnitude of any such 
disagreements. 
This paper follows previous work which has compared the way that health spending needs are 
assessed in England to the way they are assessed in Scotland (Ball, et al., 2015). Ball et al. 
demonstrate that the English and Scottish health allocation formulae provide similar estimates of 
the relative spending needs of the DGs. The similarity is perhaps surprising, as it follows over ten 
years of devolution, during which time the countries have pursued different policies regarding their 
respective health services. This indicates that the estimates of relative spending need may be less 
contestable than is sometimes suggested at least for health, which accounts for around one third of 
devolved spending in each DA. 
                                                          
2 In the remainder of this paper, we use the term LA to refer to local authorities which provide education 
services, of which there are some 150 in England, 32 in Scotland, 22 in Wales, and 5 in Northern Ireland. 
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We focus in this paper on school-age education spending, partly because it is a major area of 
devolved spending, accounting for 15-23% of devolved government spending in each DA, and partly 
because there is already a long history of using needs formulae to allocate resources for education 
within the UK. England has used a variety of school funding formulae since 1981; Scotland has used 
its current system of formula-based allocations to LAs since 2000. The reasons for comparing 
ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƐĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŵƵůĂǁŝƚŚ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶtĂůĞƐ ?ŽƌE/ ?ƐĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŵƵůĂĞ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ
that Scotland has an education system that is completely independent from that ŽĨŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ
(Wales, NI and England share the same GCSE qualification system) and thus it might be hypothesised 
ƚŚĂƚ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŶĞĞĚƐĨŽƌŵƵůĂŝƐŵŽƐƚůŝŬĞůǇƚŽĚŝĨĨĞƌĨƌŽŵŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ŝƚĐŽƵůĚ
be argued that the Scottish Government is able to exercise greater leverage in inter-governmental 
negotiations with the UK Government than the Welsh and NI Governments are; thus any differences 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐĂŶĚŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƐƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐǇƐƚĞŵƐĂƌĞŵŽƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽprove an obstacle 
to agreeing a needs based replacement for the Barnett formula. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes patterns of actual education 
spending across the UK territories. Section 3 describes the process for allocating education resources 
to LAs (and subsequently, to schools) in England and in Scotland, and highlights some current 
debates around schools funding. Section 4 sets out in more detail the formulae currently used in 
England and in Scotland to allocate education resources to LAs. Section 5 describes our approach to 
comparing the English and Scottish formulae. The results are presented in Section 6, focussing on 
how the English and Scottish formulae estimate the relative education spending needs of the DGs.  
Section 7 concludes.   
II. Education spending in the UK territories 
Table 1 shows some statistics on education spending per pupil in the DGs.  These figures are derived 
from total spending figures given by PESA (HM Treasury  2013) and from data on primary and 
secondary pupils enrolled in state schools from the Pupil Censuses managed by the education 
departments in each territory. To ensure comparability, we have controlled for the somewhat 
different start dates for compulsory school age education across the territories by looking at 
expenditure per pupil  in all non-special state schools between the ages of 5-15 years.  
Spending per pupil is shown in Row A.  Row B gives these results as indexes, with England set at 
1.000.  Scotland, at 1.018, spends 1.8% more per pupil than England, and Wales, at 0.941, spends 
5.9% less than England. NI has an index of 0.707, implying that it spends 29.3% less per pupil than 
ŶŐůĂŶĚ ?E/ ?ƐƌĞƐƵůƚƐĞĞŵƐƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ ?ďƵƚŝƚƐƌŽďƵƐƚŶĞƐƐĐĂŶďĞĐŚĞĐŬĞĚŝn two ways.  
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First, we consider whether the result stems from an erroneous estimate of pupil numbers. To do 
this, we repeated our calculations using ONS data on the population aged 5-15 in each territory as 
the denominator, instead of pupil numbers. Doing this results in only a slight increase in estimates of 
spend per individual in all three DGs, relative to spending in England (row C), and does not radically 
ĂůƚĞƌƚŚĞĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞŽĨE/ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ?dŚĞƐůŝŐŚƚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŽĐĐƵƌƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞĂŚŝŐŚĞƌƉƌŽƉŽƌƚion 
of pupils attend private (non-state funded) schools in England relative to the DGs, so the difference 
between the estimates of state school pupils and all individuals aged 5-15 is greater for England than 
for the DGs. 
Second, we consider whether there may be inconsistencies in how spending on primary and 
secondary education, published in PESA (HM Treasury 2013), is collated across the territories. To do 
ƚŚŝƐ ?ǁĞĐŽŵďŝŶĞW^ ?ƐĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐŽĨƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŽŶƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĂŶĚƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝƚƐ
estimates oĨƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŽŶ ‘ƐƵďƐŝĚŝĂƌǇƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƚŽĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ‘ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶŶŽƚĚĞĨŝŶĂďůĞďǇůĞǀĞů ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶŶŽƚĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚ ? ?ǁĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽĞǆĐůƵĚĞĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞƐŽĨƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŽŶƉƌĞ-primary 
and post-secondary education). With this wider definition of education spending, our estimated 
figures for spending per pupil, indexed to English per pupil spending (row D), fall to 1.010 for 
Scotland, rise to 1.048 for Wales, and rise substantially to 0.914 for NI. This indicates that a 
substantial part of the apparent per ƉƵƉŝůĨƵŶĚŝŶŐ ‘ĚĞĨŝĐŝƚ ?ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĂďŽǀĞĨŽƌE/ŝƐƐŝŵƉůǇĚƵĞƚŽĂ
ŚŝŐŚĞƌƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨE/ ?ƐĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐďĞŝŶŐĐůĂƐŝĨŝĞĚŝŶŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŵŽƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ
categories. 
TABLE 1 
Spending on primary and secondary education (2009/10) 
 England Scotland Wales NI 
A: Spending per pupil  £8,652 £8,806 £8,138 £6,115 
B: Index of per pupil spending (England = 1) 1.000 1.018 0.941 0.707 
C: Index of spending per individual aged 5-15 
(England = 1) 
1.000 1.059 0.985 0.748 
D: Index of per pupil spending  W wider definition 
(England = 1) 
1.000 1.010 1.048 0.914 
E: Index of education spending per head (England = 
1)  W wider definition 1.000 0.997 1.092 1.111 
Sources: Spend data from Public Expenditure Statistical Analysis (HM Treasury, 2012); Population 
estimates from ONS; Pupil data from individual territory Pupil Censuses 
In summary, differences in education policy and data collection methods make definitive 
comparisons of spending per pupil across the UK territories difficult, a fact that has been noted by 
others (Bain, 2006). Nonetheless, it is apparent that NI spends notably less on education per pupil 
than the other DGs territories, even if we take the wider definition of pupil spending (row D). This is 
chiefly because the Barnett formula is based on a per head of population basis with no other 
7 
 
ĂĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĨŽƌƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŶĞĞĚ ?E/ ?ƐĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐƉĞƌŚĞĂĚŽĨƚŽƚĂůƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶŝƐabout 11% 
higher than that of England (row E), but this falls to at least 8% lower than English spending on a per 
pupil basis ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞE/ ?ƐĚĞŵŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐŝƐŵƵĐŚ ‘ǇŽƵŶŐĞƌ ?ƚŚĂŶƚŚĞƌĞƐƚŽĨƚŚĞh<. 
III. Allocating education resources by formula 
Education funding formulae are used in at least 13 EU countries (Fazekas, 2012). These formulae 
typically aim to achieve horizontal equity, so that schools with the same characteristics are funded at 
the same level, and to do this in a way which is transparent and efficient  ?>ĞǀĂēŝđ ? ? ? ? ? ?. Although 
they differ in their precise form, education formulae typically include a basic pupil allocation (often 
differentiated by grade level), pupil-specific factors for special education needs, a number of school 
specific indicators to reflect structural factors that a school cannot alter, and components to reflect 
the type of curriculum or provision offered by the school  ?^ŵŝƚŚ ? ? ? ? ? ?>ĞǀĂēŝđ ? ? ? ? ? ?. 
Education funding formulae have been used in the UK since the 1960s. The formulae have evolved 
through many iterations during this time, although many of the current debates around their design 
also arise in other countries which use such formulae. The key debates in the UK context include: 
whether the central government should use formulae to fund schools directly or to fund LAs which 
then use their own allocation mechanisms for funding schools in their area; the extent to which 
funding formulae should operate on the basis of inputs (e.g. numbers of pupils with given 
characteristics) or some measure of outcome; the level of resources that should be allocated to 
address educational disadvantage; and the autonomy that individual schools should have in deciding 
how these resources are spent. The rest of this section reviews some of the recent changes to school 
funding in England and Scotland, and describes some of the current debates. 
Between 1997 and 2006, LAs in England received funding for school-based education via the 
Revenue Support Grant (RSG). The amount of RSG allocated to each LA was based on an assessment 
ŽĨƚŚĞ> ?ƐƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŶĞĞĚƐĨŽƌĂƌĂŶŐĞŽĨƐĞƌǀŝĐĞďůŽĐŬƐ W including education, social services, roads, 
etc.  W ĂŶĚĂůƐŽŽŶƚŚĞ> ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƌĂŝƐĞŝŶĐŽŵĞƚŚƌŽƵŐh taxes on property. The RSG was not 
hypothecated, so the LA was not obliged to match its actual spend on each block to its assessed 
need for that block. Spending needs were estimated using the so-called Formula Spending Share 
(FSS) approach. The FSS for education is described in the following section. 
In 2006- ? ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂŵĂũŽƌĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŽƚŚĞǁĂǇĞĂĐŚ> ?ƐĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĨƵŶĚĞĚ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
introduction of the Dedicated Support Grant (DSG), a specific (ring-fenced) grant which the LA must 
spend on education. Although it cannot spend less on education than it receives through the DSG, it 
can spend more by using other sources.  
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^'ƐĂƌĞůĂƌŐĞůǇĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ƐƉĞŶĚ-ƉůƵƐ ?ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ?ǁŚĞƌĞďǇŐƌĂŶƚƐĞƋƵĂůĂĨůĂƚ-rate 
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŽŶƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐǇĞĂƌ ?ƐĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽn, adjusted for changes in pupil numbers. The overall DSG 
budget can also change from year to year to reflect changes in policy responsibilities of LAs or 
schools (in 2014/15 for example there was a reduction to DSG to reflect the removal of schools from 
tŚĞŝƌƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞŶĞƌŐǇĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇƐĐŚĞŵĞ ?ďƵƚĂŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽ^'ƚŽƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐĐŚŽŽůƐ ?ŶĞǁ
responsibilities in assessing newly qualified teachers); these additions and subtractions however 
tend to be made on a per pupil basis, and do not affect relative per pupil allocations. Thus although 
the DSG allocations are not directly informed by current estimates of LA education spending needs, 
the pattern of allocations of DSG to LAs is implicitly predicated on the spending needs of LAs as 
estimated by the former FSS model; we demonstrate this point empirically later in the paper.  
Under the SSA/FSS approach, LAs were free to allocate funds between schools within their 
jurisdiction as they choose. LAs used their own formulae for allocating their grant to schools within 
their jurisdiction. But because different LAs used different funding formulae, schools with similar 
characteristics could receive widely differing levels of per pupil funding (Chowdry and Sibieta, 2011).  
To address this issue, the government aims to introduce a national funding formula for schools, 
rather than LAs, arguing that a national formula for schools would be fairer, simpler and more 
transparent than the existing system. The government plans to introduce such a formula in the next 
Parliament (post 2015), but meanwhile, as an interim measure, in 2013/14 the government 
introduced guidelines as to how LAs should allocate DSG resources to schools. This guidance 
specifies two mandatory factors which LAs must use in allocating grant to schools (pupil numbers 
and a measure of education deprivation), and identifies a further 10 indicators which LAs may 
optionally use (these ranging from measures of sparsity to measures of prior to attainment). A 
 ‘DŝŶŝŵƵŵ&ƵŶĚŝŶŐ'ƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞ ?ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƐƚŚŽƐĞƐĐŚŽŽůƐƚŚĂƚƐĞĞůĂƌŐĞŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ
budgets as a result of application of the new guidelines (the MFG was set at -1.5% in 2013/14 and 
2014/15, and ensures that funding per pupil for any school cannot drop by more than 1.5% in any 
one year).  
In a further attempt to move towards a new national formula, for 2015/16 the government has 
allocated an additional £390m of schools funding to LAs on the basis of a new needs formula. 
Although this £390m allocation is relatively small in the context of an overall DSG budget of £40bn, 
and thus is more an augmentation of the existing formula rather than representing a wholly new 
ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĨŽƌŵƵůĂ ?ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŚĞƌĂůĚĞĚƚŚĞĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƚŝŵĞŝŶĂĚĞĐĂĚĞƚŚĂƚ
funding has been allocated to local areas on the basis of the actual characteristics of their pupils and 
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ƐĐŚŽŽůƐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƐŝŵƉůǇƚŚĞŝƌŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐůĞǀĞůƐŽĨĨƵŶĚŝŶŐ ? ?dŚĞĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚŝƐĨŽƌŵƵůĂĂƌĞ
described in more detail in Section 6.  
A further important change to school funding was the introduction of the pupil premium in 2011. 
This provides a fixed sum for pupils between reception and year 11 classed as having a deprived 
background, defined chiefly as eligibility for Free School Meals. In 2011 the pupil premium was set at 
£488 per eligible pupil, but the value of the premium has since increased substantially, and by 
2014/15 had reached £1300 for Primary pupils and £935 for Secondary pupils (bringing total 
expenditure to £2.5bn). The pupil premium is allocated to schools directly, rather than to LAs, and 
can thus be seen as another part of the move towards a national school funding formula over which 
LAs have little control.  
The Scottish system of funding education is similar to the system that operated in England before 
the DSG was introduced. The Scottish Government allocates a block grant to each of the 32 Scottish 
>Ɛ ?ĂĐŚ> ?ƐŐƌĂŶƚĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂŶĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨŝƚƐƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŶĞĞĚ ?ŬŶŽǁŶĂƐŝƚƐ'ƌĂŶƚ
Aided Expenditure (GAE), and its capĂĐŝƚǇƚŽƌĂŝƐĞŝŶĐŽŵĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚĂǆĞƐŽŶƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇ ?ĂĐŚ> ?Ɛ'
is broken into a number of service areas, of which education is the largest. The block grant is not 
hypothecated, so each LA can spend more or less on education than the figure calculated by the 
education GAE. As in England, LAs then allocate grant to schools within their jurisdiction. 
In NI, schools are funded directly by the Department of Education NI according to a needs-based 
formula known as the Common Funding Scheme. Introduced in 2005, this Scheme allocates 
resources to schools based on age-weighted pupil numbers, school size, social disadvantage, 
attainment, teacher salaries, and other pupil characteristics (Department of Education Northern 
Ireland, 2013). The formula has undergone periodic changes, most recently an enhanced emphasis 
on pupils who are socially deprived. A separate formula known as ARNE (Assessment of Relative 
Needs Exercise) is used to allocate resources to the five Education and Library Boards for the 
provision of local education services that are not managed by individual schools.  
In Wales, a block grant is allocated to LAs using Standard Spending Assessments (SSA). The SSA is an 
assessment of LA spending need across a range of service areas, including education (Welsh 
Government, 2012). The education element of the SSA is based on a variety of measures of pupil 
numbers, school size and sparsity, and measures of social deprivation. The approach is thus very 
similar to the Scottish GAE system, and similar to the English FSS system that operated prior to 2008. 
In summary, both England and Scotland have, until recently, allocated unhypothecated grant to LAs 
to spend on education, and allocate to schools, as they see fit. Although the schools grant in England 
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is now ring-fenced, there are similar concerns in both countries as to the variation in resources 
received by schools of similar characteristics. Both England and Scotland are therefore investigating 
the potential for more nationally-based allocation arrangements that would in effect reduce the 
level of freedom of LAs to determine how education resources are spent (Department for Education, 
2012; Cameron, 2012).  
Both the English and Scottish formulae have been developed by predicting existing expenditure 
patterns from need and cost influencing indicators. Longer term, there is interest in the possibility of 
allocating resources to schools in such a way as to achieve explicit outcomes or levels of attainment. 
Bramley et al. (2011) demonstrate how such an approach might be applied, but it is clear that there 
remain difficulties with the outcome-based approach both in terms of how attainment is defined, 
and the uncertainty of the causal relationship between education spending and student 
performance (Dearden and Vignoles, 2011; Gibbons, et al., 2012; Holmlund, et al., 2010; Hanushek, 
2010; Machin, et al., 2010). It is clear therefore that needs based formula funding will continue to be 
used in England and Scotland to allocate school resources to local authorities. The main debates are 
around the extent to which local authorities should have autonomy to deviate from national 
formulae when passing resources on to schools, and the extent to which there is an appropriate 
balance between transparency and sensitivity to local need (i.e. simplicity and complexity). 
IV. Comparing the FSS and GAE 
Both the English FSS and the Scottish GAE systems attempt to measure the relative spending needs 
of LAs for school education, and allocate grant to LAs on the basis of these assessments. In this 
section we outline the structure of the English FSS and Scottish GAE formulae for allocating schools 
grants, and describe the data used by the two formulae. The aim of the paper is to compare how 
similar the pattern of resources made by each formula is, and our method for doing so is described 
in Section 5. In section 6 we also describe ƚŚĞ ‘&ĂŝƌĞƌ^ĐŚŽŽůƐ&ƵŶĚŝŶŐ ?ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŚĂƚŝƐďĞŝŶŐƵƐĞĚƚŽ
allocate some additional resources in England in 2015/16.  
It might be questioned why we place so much emphasis on comparing GAE with FSS, given that FSS 
has not been formally applied since 2005/6. The answer is that FSS remains the formula through 
ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŶĞĞĚƐŽĨŶŐůŝƐŚ>ƐĂƌĞŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚůǇĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚ ?ŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƐƉĞnd-ƉůƵƐ ?
methodology for uprating allocations that underpins the DSG. Figure 1 plots the actual education 
funding allocation per pupil made to each English LA in 2014/15 through the DSG and the Pupil 
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Premium3  W expressed relative to the English per pupil average allocation of 1  W against the per pupil 
relative need score for each English LA as assessed by the FSS and applied to LA data from 2009/10. 
dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂǀĞƌǇĐůŽƐĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚǁŽ ‘ƐĐŽƌĞƐ ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶůŝŶĞŚĂƐĂĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚƚĞƌŵ
that is not significantly different from zero and a slope coefficient that is not significantly different 
from one, implying that the two approaches effectively allocate resources in an identical way on 
average.  
There is some variation around this relationship which is to be expected. Some LAs would not have 
been funded at the level implied by the FSS needs assessment in 2005/6 given damping adjustments. 
ĂŵƉŝŶŐĂĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞŵĂĚĞƚŽ>Ɛ ?ĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƐŽƚŚĂƚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů>ƐĚŽŶŽƚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞůĂƌŐĞ
shifts in funding from one year to the next, even if, for historic reasons, they currently receive a 
much higher level of resources than is implied by the assessment of spending need). Thus even if all 
that had happened since 2005/6 was that each LA had seen an equivalent proportion increase in its 
per pupil funding there would not be a perfect match between the assessment of need in 2005/6 
and actual funding in 2014/15 (in fact, we would not expect a perfect correlation between the 
assessment of need in 2005/6 and actual funding in 2005/6). In summary, the FSS is a good proxy for 
the pattern of resource distribution in 2014/15. 
  
                                                          
3 Pupil Premium resources are allocated to schools rather than LAs, but we treat them as if they are allocated 
to LAs as the Pupil Premium reflects an implicit judgement by the Government as to the spending needs 
associated with each LA. 
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FIGURE 1 
Comparing the DSG and Pupil Premium allocation 2014/15 with the FSS needs assessment 
 
The Scottish education GAE, as applied during the 2008/11 spending period, assesses LA spending 
needs for compulsory-age education across 13 separate components (Table 2). Three of these 
components (primary school teaching staff; secondary school teaching staff; and school non-
teaching staff and property) account for 68% of the total allocation. The remaining components 
include amounts for special education, school transport, school meals, education deprivation. 
For each component, LA spending need is derived by reference to a primary indicator and a 
secondary indicator. The primary indicator is used to allocate the total level of resources available 
ĨŽƌĂŐŝǀĞŶĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚĂŵŽŶŐ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ>ƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŚĂƌĞƐŽĨƚŚĂƚŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌ ?&Žƌ
example, the primary indicator for the Primary School Teaching Staff component is the number of 
ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƐĐŚŽŽůƉƵƉŝůƐ ?/ĨĂŐŝǀĞŶ>ŚĂƐ ?A?ŽĨ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐƉƌŝŵĂƌǇƐĐŚŽŽůƉƵƉŝůƐ ?ƚŚĞŶŝƚǁŝůůŝŶŝƚŝĂůůǇďĞ
allocated 5% of the £902 million available for this component. The secondary indicator is used to 
redistribute those initial shares between authorities based on needs additional to the per capita 
amount. In the primary school teaching staff component for example, the secondary indicator 
adjusts the initial per pupil shares based on a measure of rurality and school size. The strength of the 
secondary indicator relative to the primary indicator varies depending on the component in 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?> ?ƐƚŽƚĂůƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŶĞĞĚĨŽƌĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐĚĞƌŝǀĞĚďǇƐƵŵŵŝŶŐŝƚƐŶĞĞĚƐŽǀĞƌĞĂĐh 
component. 
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In the English education FSS (last used in its pure form in 2006) there are six sub-blocks within the 
education service block that pertain to compulsory school-age education. These are: 
x Primary education 
x Secondary education (up to age 15) 
x High cost pupils 
x Schools damping 
x Local Education Authority (LEA) central functions 
x LEA damping 
The two damping sub-blocks, schools damping and LEA damping, are designed to ensure that each 
school/LEA receives a minimum increase in funding, taking into account previous grant, and are thus 
not directly measures of spending need per se.  
tŝƚŚŝŶĞĂĐŚďůŽĐŬ ?>ƐƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĂ ‘ďĂƐŝĐĂŵŽƵŶƚ ?ĨŽƌĞĂĐŚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞĐůŝĞŶƚŐƌŽƵƉ ?
ƉůƵƐŽŶĞŽƌŵŽƌĞ ‘ƚŽƉ-ƵƉƐ ? ?dĂďůĞ ? ? ?&ŽƌƚŚĞWƌŝŵĂƌǇĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶďůŽĐŬĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉle, LAs received a 
basic amount of £2,266 for each primary education pupil, plus top-ƵƉƐĨŽƌ ‘ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ
ŶĞĞĚƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƐƉĂƌƐŝƚǇ ? ?dŚĞůĞǀĞůŽĨƚŚĞƚŽƉ-up for each LA was calculated by reference to various 
indicators. The primary education additional needs top-up was calculated using data on the number 
of pupils whose mother tongue is not English, the number of children of income support or income 
ďĂƐĞĚũŽďƐĞĞŬĞƌ ?ƐĂůůŽǁĂŶĐĞĐůĂŝŵĂŶƚƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶŽĨǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐƚĂǆ-credit 
claimants. Additionally, the English FSS contained an area cost adjustment (ACA) which compensates 
LAs which face particularly high wage and other factor costs (principally those in London and the 
southeast region). 
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TABLE 2 
Summary of indicators used in Scottish education GAE for 5-15 year olds 
Component Indicators used 
Primary school teaching staff 
Primary sector pupils 
Percentage pupils in small schools 
Secondary school teaching staff 
Secondary sector pupils 
Island LA adjustment 
School non-teaching staff, 
property etc 
All education authority pupils 
Urban settlement pattern 
Special education Population aged 2-19 
School transport 
Population aged 5-15 
Population dispersion 
School meals 
Pupils taking meals 
Income support dependents per 1000 aged  0-19 
School hostels and clothing 
All education authority pupils 
Hostel places per 1000 pupils 
Income support dependents per 1000 aged 0-19 
School security 
Number of pupils 
Number of establishments 
Gaelic education N/A 
Teachers for ethnic minorities Number of ethnic minority pupils 
Education deprivation 
Primary schools  W weighted free meals registration 
Secondary schools  W weighted free meals registration 
National Priorities Action Fund Government-determined 
Former Excellence Fund Share of previous settlement 
Notes: Indicators in italics are secondary indicators. Source: Scottish Government (2008) 
TABLE 3 
Summary of indicators used in English education FSS for 5-15 year olds 
Sub-block Top-ups Indicators 
Primary education 
Basic amount Pupils aged 5-10 
Additional education needs 
top-up 
Pupils whose mother tongue is not English 
Children of IS/ income based JSA claimants 
Children of working families tax-credit claimants 
Sparsity top-up A function of population density 
Area Cost Adjustment (ACA) Based on earnings data 
Secondary education 
Basic amount Pupils aged 11+ 
Additional education needs 
top-up 
Pupils in low-achieving ethnic groups 
Children of IS/ income based JSA claimants 
Children of working families tax-credit claimants 
ACA As above 
High-cost pupils 
Basic amount 
Low birthweight births 
Children of IS/ income based JSA claimants 
Population aged 3-15 
ACA As above 
LEA central functions 
Basic amount Pupils aged 3-18 
Deprivation top-up Children of IS/ income based JSA claimants 
Sparsity top-up A function of population density 
LEA fixed cost amount Fixed amount per LA 
ACA As above 
Notes: although the indicators used are often the same across different sub-blocks, the weights 
attached to indicators vary. In some cases, the top-up amounts are calculated as a non-linear 
function of the indicators. Source: ODPM (2005) 
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V. Approach 
The analysis in this paper involves applying the English FSS and Scottish GAE education formulae in 
turn to all LAs in the UK. The aim is to identify the relative spending need of each LA for compulsory 
school age education if it was treated as an English LA, and compare this with the estimate of its 
relative spending need for compulsory school age education if it was treated as a Scottish LA.  
To compare FSS and GAE, the data for the factors listed in Tables 2 and 3 were collated for each LA 
and applied with the appropriate weightings. Most of the data required on pupil and school 
characteristics were available from the Pupil Censuses produced annually by the education 
departments in each territory (for example, data on pupil numbers, free school meal eligibility, pupil 
ethnicity, school size). Data on wider population and labour market characteristics (for example 
benefit claimant rates, earnings data) were available from national statistical offices, as were data on 
settlement patterns to inform various indicators of rurality/sparsity.  
For each territory, the data on schools and pupil numbers relate to all publicly funded schools 
(including academies, foundation schools, etc.), but exclude special schools and private schools4. 
More information on our data sources and assumptions are available from our two methodology 
papers (Ball, et al., 2012a; Ball, et al., 2012b). 
All data relate to the 2009/10 academic year, so the results indicate the relative spending needs of 
LAs in that year, had the formulae been applied in that year. In other words, we consider what the 
relative spending needs would be for each LA if the English 2005/6 needs formula was applied to LAs 
in 2009/10 Likewise we consider what the relative spending needs of each LA would be if the 
Scottish needs formula for 2009/10 was applied in that year.  
dŚĞ ‘ĚĂŵƉŝŶŐ ?ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƌŵƵůĂĞĂƌĞĂĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞŵĂĚĞƚŽ>Ɛ ?ĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƐŽƚŚĂƚ
individual LAs do not experience large shifts in funding from one year to the next. The MFG 
mentioned in the previous section is an example of a damping element  W the MFG ensures that no 
school experiences a drop in funding of more than 1.5% in any one year, regardless of the extent to 
which funding formulae suggest that that school might be being over-funded currently. We  exclude 
ĚĂŵƉŝŶŐĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂƐǁĞĂƌĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŶŐ>Ɛ ?ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐrelative 
                                                          
4 In England, academies and foundation schools are publicly funded schools that are outwith control of the 
local authority and are funded directly by the Education Funding Agency. However, for the purposes of 
assessing the overall education spending needs of the UK territories, we include them in our analysis of the 
spending needs of each LA.  
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spending needs, without the bias introduced by conditioning LA resource allocations on past levels 
of grant. 
The data were applied to all education LAs in the UK (of which there are 150 in England, 32 in 
Scotland, 22 in Wales, and five in NI). The rationale for applying the formulae at LA level was two-
fold. First, there are elements of both the English and Scottish education formulae that are based on 
thresholds (i.e. where LAs above or below a particular threshold receive no resources, whilst other 
LAs receive a sum that is a function of a particular indicator). Thus the only reliable way of assessing 
the relative spending needs of each territory is to aggregate the results from each LA within the 
territory. Second, having results at LA level allows us to make more interesting comparisons about 
how the two formulae assess relative needs. 
tŚĞŶĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚĨŽƌŵƵůĂ ?Ăůů>ƐǁĞƌĞƚƌĞĂƚĞĚ ‘ĂƐŝĨ ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ>Ɛ ?ĂŶĚŝƚŝƐ
assumed that the transition from primary to secondary school occurred at year 8. Similarly, when 
applying the two English ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƐ ?Ăůů>ƐǁĞƌĞƚƌĞĂƚĞĚ ‘ĂƐŝĨ ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŶŐůŝƐŚ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶ
from primary to secondary school occurred in Year 7. Given that the paper is motivated by the desire 
to understand the DG ?s spending needs for compulsory-age school education (i.e. for pupils aged 5-
15), elements of the formulae that relate specifically to pre-school nursery education, and funding 
associated with sixth-form colleges, are excluded. This enables the analysis to compare on a like-for-
like basis the spending needs associated with compulsory age schooling, having abstracted from 
issues around pre-school and post-16 education. 
When we apply FSS and the possible new simpler English formula, we are comparing the spending 
needs of all UK LAs against some measure of average per pupil need in England; and when we apply 
GAE, we are comparing the spending needs of all UK LAs against average per pupil needs in Scotland. 
In the results, we then rescale the GAE estimates of relative need so that they are expressed relative 
to per pupil spending needs in England. 
VI. Results 
1. Comparing formulae results: UK territories 
Table 4 shows the results of applying the English and Scottish education formulae to the UK 
territories. Row A shows the relative per pupil spending need of the UK territories (expressed 
relative to English per pupil spending needs of 1) according to the English FSS formula. Row B shows 
the relative per pupil spending needs of the UK territories according to the Scottish GAE formula 
(again expressed relative to English per pupil spending needs of 1).  
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The two formulae are reasonably similar in how they assess the per pupil spending needs of the DGs, 
and perceive little overall difference in the range of per pupil spending needs across territories. The 
English FSS assesses the DGs spending needs to range from 0.977 to 0.988 (i.e. per pupil need in the 
DGs ranges from 2.3% beůŽǁŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƐƚŽ ? ? ?A?ďĞůŽǁŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ? ?dŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ'ĂƐƐĞƐƐĞƐƚŚĞŵƚŽ
ƌĂŶŐĞĨƌŽŵ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŽ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ĨƌŽŵ ? ? ?A?ďĞůŽǁŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƐƚŽ ? ? ?A?ĂďŽǀĞŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ? ? 
Furthermore, both formulae agree on the rank of the devolved territories with regard to per pupil 
spending need. They assess NI to have the lowest per pupil spending needs, Wales to have the 
second lowest spending needs, and Scotland to have the highest spending needs of the devolved 
territories.  
In the English FSS formula, NI has relatively low needs for three main reasons: it has relatively few 
LAs (and so gets a lower per pupil allocation from the LA fixed amount); it has a low proportion of 
ĞƚŚŶŝĐŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇƉƵƉŝůƐ ?ĂŶĚŝƚƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƐŶŽĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂƌĞĂĐŽƐƚĂĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚ ? ? ?E/ ?ƐŶĞĞĚ
score is also relatively low according to the Scottish formula. One reason for this is that, although NI 
has a relatively high level of overall deprivation, the Scottish formula allocates more resources to 
areas where deprivation is concentrated in particular schools, on which measure NI seems to do 
relatively less well. The measure of education deprivation is discussed in a subsequent sub-section. 
Overall there appears relatively little difference in the assessed per pupil spending needs of the DGs, 
and certainly less difference than is observed in current actual per pupil spending.  Comparing the 
results from rows A-B to actual per pupil spending on education (row C) reveals that Welsh 
education spending per pupil looks generous relative to need, while education spending in NI 
appears low relative to need. 
Rows D-E of Table 4 express the results in terms of spending need per total population, as opposed 
to per pupil. The spending needs per population are markedly different, given differences in the 
demographic composition of the territories. NI in particular has a high proportion of school-age 
pupils relative to the rest of the UK, while Scotland has a relatively low proportion. On a per capita 
ďĂƐŝƐ ?tĂůĞƐ ?ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŶĞĞĚƌŝƐĞƐƚŽďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ? ? ?A? ?&^^ ?ƚŽ3.8% (GAE ?ĂďŽǀĞŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ?
^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐƉĞƌĐĂƉŝƚĂŶĞĞĚŝƐƐůŝŐŚƚůǇďĞůŽǁŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ?ǁŚŝůĞE/ ?ƐŝƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇĂďŽǀĞ ?dŚĞƌĞƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ
good comparability between the three formulae  W E/ ?ƐĂƐƐĞƐƐĞĚŶĞĞĚǀĂƌŝĞƐĨƌŽŵ ? ? ? ?A?ƚŽ19.6% 
ĂďŽǀĞŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ?ǁŚŝůĞ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐŶĞĞĚǀĂƌŝĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ? ? ?A?ƚŽ ? ? ?A?ďĞůŽǁŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ? 
Given that the FSS contains an adjustment for factor costs, the ACA, but the Scottish formula does 
not, it is interesting to consider how different the FSS scores would be if the ACA was excluded. Row 
F of Table 4 shows the relative needs estimates of the FSS formula (per pupil) if the ACA is excluded 
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from all its sub-blocks, while Row G excludes the ACA from the FSS estimate of spending need per 
capita. Excluding the ACA raises the relative per pupil need scores of Wales, Scotland and NI to 
1.017, 1.017 and 1.012 respectively (the relative need of the devolved territories rises because of 
the reduction in to the assessed need of local authorities in the south east of England). Expressing 
these results on a per capita basis somewhat lowers the relative needs of Scotland, while raising the 
relative needs of Wales and NI.  
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TABLE 4 
Comparing the spending needs of the UK territories (England = 1) 
 England Wales Scotland NI 
Per pupil need:     
  A: English FSS 1.000 0.981 0.988 0.977 
  B: Scottish GAE 1.000 0.996 1.003 0.984 
     
C: Actual per pupil spend 1.000 1.048 1.01 0.914 
Per capita need:     
  D: English FSS 1.000 1.023 0.975 1.187 
  E: Scottish GAE 1.000 1.038 0.99 1.196 
Excluding ACA from FSS:     
 F:  English FSS (per pupil) 1.000 1.017 1.017 1.012 
G: English FSS (per capita) 1.000 1.060 1.004 1.230 
 
2. ǯ-age education 
To further compare the patterns of allocations made by the English FSS and Scottish GAE formulae, 
Figure 2 ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞƐƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĂƉŝƚĂĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĞǇŵĂŬĞƚŽĞĂĐŚ>ŝŶƚŚĞh< ?ĂĐŚ> ?ƐŶĞĞĚƐĐŽƌĞ
according to the English FSS  is plotted on the x-axis, whilĞ>Ɛ ?ŶĞĞĚƐĐŽƌĞƐĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ
GAE are plotted on the y-axis. The dashed 45o line represents the line that LAs would be located on if 
their relative per capita spending needs were assessed equivalently by the two formulae; points to 
the left of this line imply that the Scottish GAE formula assesses relative need to be greater than the 
English FSS formula does, while points to the left imply the converse. 
  
There is a reasonably strong correlation between the two formulae in how the relative education 
spending needs of individual LAs are assessed. The slope coefficient on the line of best fit between 
the formulae is 0.89 (we would expect the coefficient to be one if the two formulae assessed needs 
identically). There is clearly some variation around this average relationship;  there is more than a 
10% difference in assessed relative per capita need for 32 out of the 208 LAs when these formulae 
are compared.  
Much of this variation between the English FSS and Scottish GAE formulae arises because the FSS 
formula includes an Area Cost Adjustment (ACA) which allocates substantial additional resources to 
LAs in London and southeast England. Figure 3 plots the same information as Figure 2, but having 
removed the ACA from the FSS formula. The relationship between the GAE and FSS formulae is now 
even stronger, witnessed by the higher R2: there is now more than a 10% difference in assessed per 
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capita need for only 11 LAs when comparing the two formulae. How should this be interpreted? One 
argument is to say that the only relevant comparison is between the GAE and the FSS including the 
ACA, given that the ACA is used as part of the English needs assessment. However, it could also be 
argued that the only reason that the Scottish GAE formula does not include an ACA is because it 
does not face the substantial geographic variation in living costs that are observed in England; thus, 
in comparing the two formulae, what is most important is to compare the assessment of LA needs 
for the type of LAs that both countries have, which is effectively what is happening in Figure 3.  
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FIGURE 2 
Comparing the per capita allocations to Local Authorities made by the English FSS and Scottish 
GAE formulae 
 
FIGURE 3 
Comparing the per capita  allocations to Local Authorities made by the English FSS and Scottish 
GAE formulae (excluding ACA from English formulae) 
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If a formula was introduced to allocate resources to the UK territories, the governments of each 
territory might come under pressure to use such a formula to allocate resources within their 
territories. A key question in determining the political viability of such a formula would therefore 
depend on the extent to which such a formula would result in a different pattern of funding 
allocations to individual LAs from those observed currently5.  
>Ğƚ ?ƐĂƐƐƵŵĞƚŚĂƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐŚĂǀĞĂŐƌĞĞĚŽŶĂŶĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŶĞĞĚƐĨŽƌŵƵůĂĨŽƌĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŶŐ
grant to the DGs which effectively represents a compromise between the Scottish GAE and the 
English FSS. How different would the pattern of allocations to LAs be if this formula was also used 
within each territory? For England, we have data on the actual education grants received in 2009/10. 
Comparing these actual grant allocations on a per pupil basis with the relative per pupil needs 
asseƐƐŵĞŶƚƐĚĞƌŝǀĞĚĨƌŽŵŽƵƌŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƚŝĐĂů ‘ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ?ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƌĞǀĞĂůƐƚŚĂƚ ? ?ŽĨ ? ? ?ŶŐůŝƐŚ>Ɛ
would be allocated a per pupil sum that was more than 5% different from their current per pupil 
allocation. Although this sounds like a large error, it is important to note that 24 English LAs received 
in 2009/10 an allocation that was more than 5% different from their FSS-assessed per pupil need; 
differences between allocations and assessed need result from the application of damping rules 
which are designed to ensure that LA allocations do not change abruptly from one year to the next. 
For Scotland, it is not possible to ascertain actual grant allocations specifically for education. This is 
because the GAE education need score is combined with needs assessments for other service areas 
and an assessment of each LA ?s ability to raise revenue from taxes on property; the resulting block 
grant does not explicitly allocate an amount for education. We therefore compare each LA ?s 
education need score on GAE with its need score on the hypothetical average formula. This reveals 
ƚŚĂƚŽŶůǇƚǁŽŽĨ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ? ?>ƐǁŽƵůĚďĞĂůůŽĐĂƚĞĚĂƉĞƌƉƵƉŝůƐƵŵŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ ?A?ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĨƌŽŵ
ƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ĂĐƚƵĂů ?ĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ ‘ĂĐƚƵĂů ?ĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƚĂŬĞŶŽďĞƚŚĞ'ŶĞĞĚƐĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚƐĐŽƌĞ
(these two LAs being Orkney and Shetland). 
3. The 2015/16 English Fairer Schools Funding Formula 
As noted previously, in its allocation of schools funding to LAs in 2015/16, the government has used 
a needs formula ?ƚŚĞ ‘&ĂŝƌĞƌ^ĐŚŽŽůƐ&ƵŶĚŝŶŐ ? ?&^& ?ĨŽƌŵƵůĂ, to allocate some £390m. The purpose of 
ƚŚŝƐĨƵŶĚŝŶŐŝƐƚŽĂůůŽĐĂƚĞĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ůĞĂƐƚĨĂŝƌůǇĨƵŶĚĞĚůŽĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?dŽ
allocate this resource, the government established minimum funding levels that a LA should attract 
for its pupils and schools in 2015/16 (Table 5). These minimum funding levels are based on the 
average amounts that LAs used in their own local formulae in 2013/14. The government first 
calculates the amount each LA would receive via the DSG allocation in 2015/16 given the 
                                                          
5 We are indebted to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this point. 
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commitment to fund each LA at the same cash value per pupil as it received in 2014/15. It then 
applies the minimum funding amounts shown in Table 5 to the relevant number of pupils and 
schools in each LA to calculate a new total. If this new total is more thaŶƚŚĞ> ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉĞƌƉƵƉŝů
ĐĂƐŚůĞǀĞů ?ƚŚĞ> ?ƐĨƵŶĚŝŶŐŝƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŶĞǁůĞǀĞů ?/ĨƚŚĞŶĞǁƚŽƚĂůŝƐůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ
ĐĂƐŚĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞ> ?ƐĨƵŶĚŝŶŐƌĞŵĂŝŶƐƵŶĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ ? 
TABLE 5 
2015/16 Fairer Schools Funding Formula 
Indicator Amount 
Basic per pupil amount Primary £2,845 
Key stage 3: £3,951 
Key stage 4: £4,529 
Deprivation Between £893 and £1,974 
Looked after children £1,009 
Low prior attainment Primary: £878 
Secondary: £1,961 
English as an additional language Primary: £505 
Secondary: £1,216 
School lump sum Primary: £117,082 
Secondary: £128,189 
Sparsity sum for schools vital to serving rural 
communities 
Up to £53,988 
Area Cost Adjustment to increase minimum 
funding in areas with higher labour market costs 
 
 
 ? ?ŽĨŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ? ? ?>ƐƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐƚŚĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?FSF formula. 
The formula allocates resources in a very different pattern from the existing pattern of allocations, 
indeed the point of the formula is to correct perceived iniquities in the current pattern. In particular, 
the new formula tends to benefit more rural areas over inner cities relative to the old formula. This 
is the result of the inclusion of the sparsity sum, the school lump sum (which in per pupil terms 
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benefits areas with smaller schools) and the new ACA which is calculated using a different 
methodology and thus allocates relatively fewer resources to high-cost inner city areas. Given that 
the funding allocated by this formula represents just 1% of the total DSG allocation in 2015/16, this 
ĨŽƌŵƵůĂƐŚŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚďĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŽĨĂƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐǁŚĂƚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚďĞůŝĞǀĞƐĂŶĞǁŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
funding formula should look like. Indeed, the government points out that LAs are under no 
obligation to follow this formula when allocating funds to schools within their areas, and that the 
national funding formula will be a matter for the next spending review. And the overall pattern of 
allocations made in 2015/16  W including the Pupil Premium  W is still very closely approximated by the 
FSS need formula (Figure available from authors on request). 
Nonetheless, it is useful to consider how the 2015/16 FSF formula would allocate resources across 
the UK territories, if it was used for this purpose. Table 6 shows the results6. The 2015/16 formula 
assesses the relative per pupil spending needs of the DGs somewhat more generously than does 
either the FSS and the GAE. Row A shows that tĂůĞƐ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƉĞƌƉƵƉŝůŶĞĞĚƐĂƌĞĂƌŽƵŶĚ ? ? ?A?
ŚŝŐŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ?ǁŚŝůĞ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐĂŶĚE/ ?ƐĂƌe each 1% higher. ZŽǁƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĂƚtĂůĞƐ ?
ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƉĞƌĐĂƉŝƚĂŶĞĞĚƐĂƌĞĂƌŽƵŶĚ ? ? ?A?ŚŝŐŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƐǁŚŝůĞE/ ?ƐĂƌĞĂƌŽƵŶĚ ? ? ? ?A?ŚŝŐŚĞƌ ?
ƚŚŽƵŐŚ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐŶĞĞĚƐƌĞŵĂŝŶĂďŽƵƚ ?A?ůŽǁĞƌƚŚĂŶŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ? 
TABLE 6 
Applying the 2015/16 English Fairer Schools Funding formula to the DGs 
 England Wales Scotland NI 
A: Per pupil 1.000 1.023 1.007 1.006 
B: Per capita 1.000 1.067 0.994 1.223 
 
 
4. Allocating funding for education deprivation 
We now compare how the Scottish GAE and English FSS allocate resources for education 
deprivation. There is widespread recognition that poverty and socio-economic disadvantage are 
major influencers of pupil attainment (West, 2009; Glennerster, 2002), and there is significant 
interest in the extent to which these effects might be mitigated through additional spending.  The 
House of Commons Select Committee on Education and Skills (2003) ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘/ƚŝƐƵŶĂƌŐƵĂďůĞ
from the evidence presented to us that poverty is the single biggest indicator of low educational 
ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?DŽƌĞƌĞĐĞŶƚ research demonstrates that there is a considerable attainment gap at 
school entry between pupils eligible to receive school meals and the rest, and that this gap widens 
                                                          
6 Figures in Table 6  are derived by applying the factors in Table 5 to 2009/10 LA data for the same set of LAs as 
was considered previously. We excluded tŚĞĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƌŵƵůĂƉĞƌƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŽ ‘ůŽǁƉƌŝŽƌĂƚƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚ ?ĂƐ
this is difficult to asses comparatively given differences in pupil assessment across the DGs. 
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over time (Hills, 2010). There is also evidence that concentrated poverty in particular 
neighbourhoods can aggravate poor attainment (Glennerster, 2002).  
Consequently, both funding formulae contain explicit elements for pupil disadvantage. As shown in 
Table 3, the FSS formula contains additional education need top-ups within each sub-block, 
allocating additional funds to LAs in proportion to factors such as the proportion of children living in 
households receiving unemployment and low-paid benefits. More recently, as described in Section 
3, additional resources are now being allocated to schools in England through the pupil premium, 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂŝŵďĞŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂĚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞĚďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚĐĞĂƐĞƐƚŽďĞĂďĂƌƌŝĞƌƚŽĂǇŽƵŶŐƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
ĂƚƚĂŝŶŵĞŶƚ ? (Department for Education, 2010). The GAE formula allocates additional resources for 
ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝŽŶůĂƌŐĞůǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ ‘ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĐŽŵƉŽŶĞŶƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂůůŽĐĂƚĞƐ
resources to LAs as a function of the proportion of pupils eligible for FSM. 
However, it is interesting to note some explicit differences between the English formula and the 
Scottish formula concerning the allocation of resources for education deprivation. FSS allocates 
resources in direct proportŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ ‘ĚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞĚ ?ƉƵƉŝůƐŝŶĞĂĐŚ>.  In contrast, GAE 
allocates funding for disadvantage in relation to how concentrated disadvantage is in each school7. 
This means that different LAs in Scotland receive very different amounts per pupil eligible for FSM, 
with Glasgow receiving 53% of the share of all resources attached to this indicator while some LAs 
(East Lothian, Midlothian, Western Isles) receive no resources. 
To compare how the formulae allocate resources across LAs with different levels of disadvantage, 
the 208 UK LAs in our analysis were ranked according to the level of deprivation (where deprivation 
is proxied by the proportion of children living in households claiming income support or jobseeker ?s 
allowance)8. We then calculated the relative per pupil allocations that each formula would make to 
LAs in each decile of deprivation.  
The results are shown in Figure 4. This seems to suggest that ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?s GAE is the least 
redistributive W it allocates relatively more to the least deprived LAs than the FSS, and relatively less 
to the most deprived LAs. Although this may appear to contradict the preceding discussion around 
the way in which the Scottish formula concentrates resources in the most deprived LAs, it results 
from the fact that a relatively small part of the total Scottish allocation is determined by the 
                                                          
7 ^ƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ?ƚŚĞŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌŝƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ P ‘ƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉƵƉŝůƐŝŶƚŚĞƚŽƉ ? ?A?ŽĨƐĐŚŽŽůƐƌĂŶŬĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ
of pupils registered for free school meals, expressed for each authority as a percentage of all Scottish pupils in 
ƚŚĞƚŽƉ ? ?A? ? 
8 The same analysis was performed using eligibility for FSM as the measure of deprivation, yielding virtually 
identical results to those discussed here. 
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education deprivation component9. Thus it could be argued that the Scottish formula, while 
progressive, is not particularly redistributive. 
FIGURE 4 
Per pupil relative funding by deprivation decile 
 
The fact that Scotland is able to take a different approach to the funding of disadvantaged pupils 
should be seen as a strength of devolution. However, it is difficult to draw conclusions as to which 
allocation system is most effective at addressing educational disadvantage, as the Scottish and 
English education systems seem to display similar differences in the level of educational attainment 
across socio-economic groups (Machin, et al., 2012). Furthermore, the analysis here looks at how 
resources are allocated to LAs, and LAs themselves might not then pass the education resources that 
they receive through the education block grant to schools in the same pattern that resources are 
allocated to LAs nationally. What this discussion does highlight however is how ideological 
differences in the importance attached to different factors can manifest in different funding 
formulae.  
 
                                                          
9 To test whether this result is an artefact of the ACA in the FSS formula (which might arise if LAs which receive 
additional resources through the ACA are consistently more deprived than those which do not receive the 
ACA), we repeated the analysis in Figure 3 having removed the ACA from the FSS formula. This did not 
materially alter the conclusion that England appears more progressive than Scotland. 
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
1.3
least
deprived
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 most
deprived
re
la
ti
v
e
 p
e
r 
p
u
p
il
 a
ll
o
ca
ti
o
n
 (
E
n
g
la
n
d
=
1
)
decile of LA deprivation
English FSS
Scottish GAE
27 
 
VII. Conclusions 
Devolution to Scotland, Wales and NI has provided the devolved governments in these territories 
with the opportunity to pursue different policies. This policy distinctiveness is particularly evident in 
education, where different curricula and systems of pupil assessment are in place; and policy 
distinctiveness is also seen in the ways by which the DGs allocate grant to school education within 
their own territories. This ability to pursue policy distinctiveness is both the intention and strength of 
devolution. 
But the significant spending and policy autonomy of the DGs raises challenging questions about how 
the DGs should be funded. There has long been a widespread dissatisfaction (in England and Wales) 
with the way in which resources are allocated to the DGs, and repeated calls for the Barnett formula 
ƚŽďĞƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚďǇĂ ‘ĨĂŝƌĞƌ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨŶĞĞĚƐĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƌĞƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞĂƌŶĞƚƚ
Formula has never been seriously proposed. The reason appears to lie in a belief that the 
Westminster Government and the DGs would never be able to agree on what a needs-based grant 
allocation formula might look like. 
This paper tests this hypothesis by comparing the way in which the Scottish Government allocates 
resources for schools within Scotland with the way in which the Westminster Government allocates 
resources for schools within England. In each territory, school grants are allocated on the basis of 
formulae that consider the characteristics of pupils and schools, but differ in the specific indicators 
that they use, and the weights attached to those indicators. 
In a statistical sense, these formulae appear to assess the relative spending needs of the devolved 
territories and LAs in a reasonably similar way (Table 7). The results suggest that NI has the highest 
relative spending need for school education and is currently not dedicating the level of resource to 
school education that its relative needs imply it should; Wales has relatively high spending needs but 
is currently spending more ƚŚĂŶĞŶŽƵŐŚƚŽĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚĞĨŽƌƚŚŝƐŶĞĞĚ ?^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŶĞĞĚƐĂƌĞ
ďƌŽĂĚůǇŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚŶŐůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐŝƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚŝŶƚƐƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ? 
TABLE 7 
Summary of results 
 England Scotland Wales NI 
Spending needs estimate per person (England = 1):  
A: English FSS 1.000 0.975 1.023 1.187 
B: Scottish GAE 1.000 0.99 1.038 1.196 
C: 2015/16 English FSF 1.000 1.067 0.994 1.223 
G: Current spending per person 
(England = 1) 
1.000 0.997 1.092 1.111 
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It could be argued however that statistical similarity is not the same as political similarity. Varying 
^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?ƐƉĞƌƉƵƉŝůŶĞĞĚƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƚŽŶŐůĂŶĚ ?ƐďǇ ?A?ĐŽƵůĚĞƋƵĂƚĞƚŽĂ ? ? ?ŵĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞŐƌĂŶƚ
allocation to Scotland (based on 600,000 Scottish pupils and per pupil spending in England of around 
£8,500). Whilst only representing 0.35% of its total budget, such a sum could be quite symbolic in 
the context of the politics of devolved funding; £50m is roughly what the Scottish Government 
spends to mitigate the impacts of the WestmiŶƐƚĞƌ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ‘ďĞĚƌŽŽŵƚĂǆ ? ?ĂŶĚŽŶůǇƐůŝŐŚƚůǇ
below the estimated cost of retaining the free prescription policy. 
The analysis in this paper focuses on resource allocation for school funding for those aged 5-16. A 
needs-based replacement for the Barnett Formula would also need to consider how to assess 
education spending needs more widely, covering spending needs for pre-school education, and 
Further and Higher Education. In these areas however there is much greater policy divergence 
between the DGs, the clearest example of which relates to university tuition fees (university tuition 
remains free to Scottish students; in England tuition fees of up to £9,000 per year are payable; in 
Wales and NI, tuition fees are subsidised to an extent for students from Wales and NI by the 
respective governments). Designing a system of needs assessment when policies diverge is 
potentially more challenging, as it is less clear how to define the relevant policy standard against 
which needs are assessed (King and Eiser, 2014) . However, this is no more of an issue for needs 
assessment than it is for the existing Barnett Formula, which effectively takes English policy as the 
spending standard. 
The conclusion of this paper is that there is greater similarity in how England and Scotland assess 
education spending needs than is sometimes assumed. This adds to previous literature which 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŽĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐŚĞĂůƚŚƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŶĞĞĚƐĂƌĞĂůƐŽƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ?
However it remains unclear whether the further revenue decentralisation that is happening to 
Scotland, NI and Wales will strengthen calls to replace Barnett or reduce them. On the one hand, the 
Barnett derived block grant will become a diminishingly smaller component of the budgets of the 
DGs. On the other hand, retention of the Barnett Formula might be seen as incompatible with the 
greater fiscal autonomy of the DGs.  Indeed, reform of Barnett might be seen as necessary either as 
part of a quid pro quo for further revenue decentralisation (in Scotland), or as a necessary reform to 
prevent the emergence of substantial disparities in the relative spending power of the DGs (in the 
case of Wales).  
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